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Abstract: Tax avoidance is one of the company's taxation strategies to reduce a company's tax burden. In order to realize 
tax avoidance efforts without incurring tax risks and sanctions, the role of the board of commissioners is 
important in tax avoidance efforts. The board of commissioners have to ensure the business strategy, 
management, potential risk in every decision made and ensure that the company's activities comply with 
applicable legal regulations. The board of commissioners is expected to be able to supervise and control tax 
policy. The board of commissioners must be able to carry out its supervisory function appropriately, 
independently and transparently in order to optimize financial performance and company sustainability. 
Research conducted on 156 samples of banking company data in Indonesia for the 2015-2019 period using 
regression testing has proven that only the variable number of independent commissioners has a significant 
effect on tax avoidance efforts. As for the variable of gender, tenure and political connections of the board of 
commissioners have no significant effect on tax avoidance efforts. The number of independent commissioners 
is the main factor affecting tax avoidance efforts. This is in line with the regulations of the Financial Services 
Authority and the Limited Liability Company Law. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Tax is a taxpayer contribution to the State which is 
compelling and all tax revenues are used to finance 
government activities. In Indonesia, taxes are the 
largest source of state revenue compared to other 
sources of revenue. On the other hand, the taxpayers 
view regarding tax revenue and tax compliance is 
different. The reluctance of taxpayers to fulfill their 
tax obligations still occurs because taxes are seen as 
a component of expenses, a deduction of their assets, 
a reduction in corporate profits, and a reduction in 
return for company shareholders. The problem of tax 
compliance is still a major problem in Indonesia that 
affects government revenue from taxation. 
For taxpayers, tax is an element of burden that has 
an impact on the achievement of company profits and 
assets so that taxpayers try to lower the tax paid. Tax 
avoidance is a practice that many companies do 
because this effort is legal and can reduce corporate 
tax payments (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Taylor & 
Richardson, 2012; Coulmont et al., 2018). Tax 
avoidance efforts are part of corporate governance 
(Jamei, 2017; Supriyati et al., 2019) and the 
company's overall tax strategy (Higgins et al., 2012; 
Hudiwinarsih, 2018) and part of the tax planning step 
by exploiting tax policy loopholes (Chan et al., 2013; 
Armstrong et al., 2015; Supriyati et al., 2019). Based 
on a survey report made jointly by Ernesto Crivelly, 
an investigator from the IMF in 2016, using the 
database of the International Center for Policy and 
Research (ICTD) and the International Center for 
Taxation and Development, data on corporate tax 
avoidance emerged from 3000 countries. Indonesia is 
ranked as the 11th largest with the value of taxes paid 
to the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) estimated 
at US $ 6.48 billion (https://www.tribunnews.com 
dated 20 November 2017). 
Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited 
Liability Companies Article 1 states that the 
company's organs are the General Meeting of 
Shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Board of 
Commissioners. Thus, the Financial Services 
Authority (OJK) Regulation Number 55 / POJK.03 / 
2016 concerning The Implementation of Governance 
for Commercial Banks, article 1 paragraph 1-4, 
explains the importance of the role of directors and 
boards of commissioners in banks. The board of 
commissioners is in charge of general and / or special 
supervision according to the articles of association 
and provides advice to the board of directors. The 
board of commissioners play a role in implementing 
the company's strategy including strategies in the 
field of taxation and tax avoidance efforts. 
Agency theory (Jensen &Meckling, 1976) stated 
that a conflict that occurs between the principal and 
the agent, one of which is the existence of moral 
hazard and the agent's opportunistic behavior thus a 
supervisory function for the agent is needed. The 
board of commissioners has a very important role in 
the supervisory function of company operations and 
management behavior. The board of commissioners, 
which is dominated by outsiders, has a stronger role 
because they are more independent in overseeing 
management behavior (Aliani, 2014; Chyz & 
Gaertner, 2018; Jihene & Moez, 2019). The board of 
commissioners is expected to be able to supervise and 
control tax policy as part of the company's strategy so 
that the company is able to meet stakeholder 
expectations and avoid tax sanctions. Independent 
commissioners have an effect on tax avoidance (Uun, 
2016; Doho & Santoso, 2020). However, it is 
different from research carried out by Prasetyo & 
Pramuka (2018), Kartana & Wulandari (2018), 
Novita et al, (2020) which states that independent 
commissioners have no significant effect on tax 
avoidance. 
This study focuses more on the characteristics of 
the board of commissioners. In addition to general 
provisions regarding the number of independent 
commissioners, it is also linked to gender, tenure and 
political connections to the board of commissioners. 
Executive board gender influences tax planning 
(Richardson, 2011; Aliani, 2014; Khlif & Achek, 
2017; Ambarsari et al. (2020) because gender is 
required in conservative reporting. Long tenure 
affects experience in decision making, influences 
corporate risk taking (Chan et al., 2013), as well as on 
tax planning (Goldman et al., 2017; Duan et al., 
2018). The replacement of company commissioners 
reduces tax avoidance because the company will 
receive wider public attention. Companies that have 
political connections will get government protection, 
easy access to capital loans, low risk of tax audits, 
thus making companies more aggressive in carrying 
out tax planning which results in financial 
transparency (Faccio, 2006; Butje & Tjondro, 2014; 
Duan et al., 2018). 
The problem of taxpayer compliance and tax 
avoidance is still an important topic in the field of 
taxation, as well as the results of previous research 
which have not shown consistency in the results of 
their research, which make a reference for conducting 
this research again. This study aims to see the effect 
of the characteristics of the board of commissioners 
in the banking industry on tax avoidance efforts.  
2 LITERATUR REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory describes a relationship between the 
agent as business management and the principal as a 
shareholder. The principal has the right to grant 
authority to the agent to carry out all activities on 
behalf of the principal in his capacity as decision 
making. Jensen &Meckling (1976) in agency theory, 
the contract between agent and principal occurs in the 
company's operations. The agent as the party in 
charge of managing the company has more 
information about the company's capacity, work 
environment and the company as a whole. On the 
other hand, principals do not have sufficient 
information about agent performance. The difference 
in the information held can cause harm to one of the 
parties who has less information.  
The self-assessment system currently in effect in 
Indonesia provides an opportunity for agents to 
calculate taxable income as low as possible, so that 
the tax burden borne by the company decreases. The 
existence of asymmetric information carried out by 
the agent to the principal causes the agent to be able 
to do tax planning so that the agent gets its own 
benefits that cannot be obtained from cooperation 
with the principal. Tax planning as part of the 
company's strategy must be directed not only to 
benefit the agent, but must be able to protect the 
interests of other stakeholders such as creditors, 
shareholders, and the government. The role of the 
board of commissioners is important in overseeing 
the actions of directors in respective companies, 
especially in the field of taxation. 
2.2 Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance is the process of controlling actions in 
order to avoid unwanted tax consequences. Tax 
avoidance is a transaction scheme shown by 
minimizing the tax burden by taking advantage of 
loopholes in state taxation regulations (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010; Richardson & Lanis, 2007; Taylor 
& Richardson, 2012). Tax avoidance is an effort 
made by taxpayers whether it is successful or not to 
reduce or write off the tax debt based on applicable 
taxation provisions. Tax avoidance does not violate 
tax laws because the taxpayers' efforts to reduce, 
avoid, drink or alleviate the tax burden are made 
possible by the Taxation Law.  
Tax avoidance has become an integral part of a 
company’s strategies (Supriyati et al., 2019). The role 
of the company is realized in an effort to avoid tax in 
the form of effective tax rate (ETR) which is a 
comparison of corporate tax expense with net income 
before tax (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The smaller 
the ETR percentage, the lower the company's tax 
burden. This shows an indication of the company's 
efforts to reduce the company's tax burden in legal 
ways. 
2.3 Hypothesis Developments 
2.3.1 Independent Commissioner and Tax 
Avoidance Efforts 
An independent commissioner is a member of the 
board of commissioners who is independent and has 
no relationship with other commissioners, directors, 
shareholders, or company management who have the 
task of supervising and directing the performance of 
company management. Based on OJK Regulation 
No. 33 / POJK.04 / 2014 Chapter III Article 20 
paragraph 3 Concerning the Board of Commissioners 
states that the presence of independent 
commissioners in a company is at least thirty percent 
of the total board of commissioners of the company. 
This independent commissioner is in charge of 
overseeing the performance of the company's 
management in carrying out business activities and 
directing business activities to be carried out properly 
and in accordance with applicable regulations. The 
presence of an independent board of commissioners 
in a company is very important because it can reduce 
or minimize conflicts that occur between one party 
and another. Independent commissioners may not 
have a business relationship or special relationship 
with other directors, shareholders and the board of 
commissioners because this can affect their ability to 
be neutral or impartial to anyone thus the goals of the 
company can be achieved. The company's board of 
commissioners, which is dominated by outsiders, has 
a much stronger role because they are more 
independent in monitoring the achievement of 
company performance and management behavior. 
(Uun, 2016; Sofiati & Zulaikha, 2018; Butje & 
Tjondro, 2014). The greater the number of 
independent commissioners, the greater their role in 
tax planning supervision so that tax avoidance efforts 
can avoid tax sanctions and be able to optimize the 
company's financial performance. 
H1: The number of independent commissioners has a 
significant effect on tax avoidance efforts. 
2.3.2 Gender and Tax Avoidance Efforts 
Gender is categorized as male and female. In terms of 
leadership, the difference between the two is 
communal and agentic. Communal defined is 
included as a person who is full of affection, helpful, 
friendly, kind, sympathetic, interpersonal sensitive, 
gentle, and soft-spoken. Meanwhile, men are 
associated with very aggressive, ambitious, 
dominant, confident, strong, and independent and 
individualistic characters. The differences in the 
nature of men and women have an impact on their 
behavior. One of them is risk behavior. Men and 
women have different risk preferences (Ho et al, 
2015; Khlif & Achek, 2017; Farag & Mallin, 2018). 
The impact of gender in accounting conservatism 
and earnings management is based on the fact that 
female gender is more risk averse than male. Women 
have more ethical behavior than men in choosing 
accounting policies (Francis et al., 2016; Khlif & 
Achek, 2017). However, these studies were not in line 
with research conducted by Charness & Gneezy 
(2012), Faccioet al. (2016) which explained that 
women tend to avoid risk in decision making 
compared to men. Commissioner gender has no effect 
on Tax Avoidance. This ethical behavior minimizes 
any fraudulent actions that can be committed by 
leaders or managers.  
H2: The gender of the board of commissioners has a 
significant effect on tax avoidance efforts. 
2.3.3 Tenure and Tax Avoidance Efforts 
Tenure is the service period for the board of 
commissioners to work / serve in the company. Some 
strategic management theorists argue that the tenure 
of a board of commissioners in an organization 
affects the executive's condition. The longer the 
tenure of the board of commissioners causes rigidity 
in the corporate structure and the less it is to promote 
or change the old strategy (Chyz & Gaertner, 2018). 
The board of commissioners with long tenure has 
good experience in supervision. The quality and 
performance of the board of commissioners are better 
in understanding the internal conditions of the 
company and formulate the company's external 
strategy appropriately, including the supervision of 
tax avoidance efforts by the company. 
H3: The tenure of the board of commissioners has a 
significant effect on tax avoidance efforts. 
2.3.4 Political Connections and Tax 
Avoidance Efforts 
Companies are said to have political connections if at 
least in one of the primary shareholders (a person with 
at least 10 percent of the total voting rights) or one of 
the company leaders (CEO, president or vice 
president). Chairman or company secretary) are 
members of parliament, ministry or possess a relation 
with politicians or political parties (Faccio, 2006; 
Francis et al., 2012; Butje & Tjondro, 2014; Duan et 
al., 2018). Companies with political connections will 
receive protection from the government, easy access 
to obtain capital loan, the risk of tax audits is low, 
which makes companies more aggressive in 
implementing tax planning which results in cloudy 
financial transparency. Various kinds of privileges 
can be obtained by companies easily. A board of 
commissioners with political connections is able to 
oversee the company's operations in order to reduce 
tax penalties and maintain reporting transparency. 
Political connections influence tax avoidance (Butje 
& Tjondro, 2014; Duan et al., 2018). 
H4: The political connection of the board of 
commissioners affects tax avoidance efforts. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework. 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study is quantitative research. The populations 
in this study were all banking companies listed on the 
Indonesian stock exchange. The unit of analysis used 
was the banking annual report. The observation 
period in this study was carried out in 2015-2019. The 
sampling technique in this study used purpose 
sampling with the following criteria: a) banking 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
five periods during the 2015-2019 period, b) listed 
companies have never experienced losses in the 2015- 
2019 period, c) does not have an ETR value above 1 
or below 0. The data used is the annual report and the 
data is obtained from the official IDX website. 
Tax avoidance is a transaction scheme shown by 
minimizing the tax burden by taking advantage of the 
loophole of tax provisions. In this study it was 
proxied using the effective tax rate (ETR) ratio used 
by Hanlon & Heitzman (2010), Lanis & Richardson 
(2011) namely income tax expense divided by net 
profit before tax. The number of Independent 
Commissioners is a ratio between the number of 
independent commissioners and the total board of 
commissioners in the company (Farag & Mallin, 
2018; Chyz & Gaertner, 2018; Ambarsariet al., 2020). 
Gender (Farag & Mallin, 2018) is a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if it is classified as female and 0 if it 
is classified as male. Tenure is the service period for 
commissioners to work / serve in the company. The 
tenure of more than two terms was given a dummy 
score of 1 and terms of office with a term of less than 
2 periods were valued as a dummy of 0. Political 
connections were given a dummy score of 1 if there 
was a political connection and 0 if there was none. 
This study also uses control variables, namely 
company characteristics such as profitability (retur 
non aset), company size (ln total assets), capital 
intensity (fixed assets compared to total assets), 
company growth (total equity compared to total 
assets) and leverage (ratio of liabilities to equity).  
Multiple linear regression analysis was used to 
examine the model and the effect of the number of 
independent commissioners (X1), gender (X2), 
tenure (X3), and political connections (X4) on tax 
avoidance efforts (Y). In addition, the coefficient of 
determination and t test were also carried out. 
The regression equation in this study is as follows: 
TA= α + β1KI + β2GDR+ β3MJ+ β4 KP+ e (1)
TA= α + β1KI + β2GDR+ β3MJ+ β4 KP+ β5ROA 
+ β6SIZE+ β7CI + β8GROWTH+ β9LEV+ e (2)
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Sampel Selection 
The banking sector was chosen as the sample in this 
study because the banking sector has a close 
relationship with tax avoidance. Revocation of PER-
01 / PJ / 2015 due to limitations in tax audits with 
banking confidentiality, however PER-01 / PJ / 2015 
stipulates that the DGT can obtain customer 





information that can be used for tax purposes. 
Following are the details of the samples obtained for 
testing where 156 sample data were obtained that 
were ready to be tested. 
Table 1: Sample composition. 
Sample Selection Criteria Total of Sample Data 
Registered company = 43 x 5 
years 
215 
Deductions based on criteria:  
The company that suffered a 
loss, ETR exceeded 1 and 
data are not available 
 49 
Total Observations 156 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The statistical analysis indicated by the minimum, 
maximum, mean, as well as the crosstab test for the 
dummy variables is shown below. The average value 
of the independent commissioner variable is 0.60, 
indicating that the number of independent 
commissioners still dominates the total board of 
commissioners. The average value of the tax 
avoidance variable is 0.23, which is close to 0, 
indicating that most companies are making tax 
avoidance efforts. The profitability average value of 
0.07 indicates the company's ability to generate 
profits is low. The average company size was 18.26 
or Rp. 399,924,414,000 shows that the company's 
assets are quite large. The average capital intensity 
value of 0.44 shows that the company's fixed assets 
are only 44% of the total assets owned. The company 
growth average value of 0.24 shows that the 
company's growth is still low. The average leverage 
level is 2.35, indicating that part of the company's 
capital comes from debt, especially from customers 
and other creditors. 
Table 2: Descriptive Test Results. 
Variable Min Max Mean 
Independent 
commissioner 0.33 1.00 0.60 
Gender 0.00 1.00 0.10 
Tenure 0.00 1.00 0.51 
Political 
connections 0.00 1.00 0.41 
Tax avoidance 0.01 0.77 0.23 
Profitability 0.00 0.64 0.07 
Company size 12.48 31.71 18.26 
Capital intensity 0.08 1.00 0.44 
Growth 0.00 0.70 0.24 
Leverage 0.15 9.81 2.35 
The results of crosstab testing showed 135 (87%) 
classified as male, and the remaining 21 (13%) were 
classified as female. When viewed from the tenure of 
the male board of commissioners, it shows that 69 
(51%) have tenure of more than 2 years, 66 (49%) and 
a tenure of less than 2 years. When viewed from the 
presence or absence of political connections, it shows 
that 76 (56%) did not have political connections, the 
remaining 59 (44%) had political connections. On the 
other hand, if it is seen from the tenure of the female 
board of commissioners, it shows that 11 (52%) had 
tenure of more than 2 years, 10 (48%) had tenure 
under 2 years. When viewed from the presence or 
absence of political connections, it shows that 16 
(76%) had no political connections, the remaining 5 
(24%) had political connections. 
Table 3: Crosstab Testing Results. 
Tenure Gender Political 
Connection 
Gender 
Male Female Male Female
<2 
periods 
66 11 No 76 16 
>2 
periods 
69 10 With 
Connections 
59 5 
Total 135 21 Total 135 21 
4.3 Results 
The results of the model test or the F test indicated the 
fit model. The results of model 1 test showed that only 
the independent commissioner variable had a 
significant effect on tax avoidance efforts. The results 
of model 2 test after the inclusion of control variables 
showed that the independent commissioner variable, 
profitability, capital intensity, company growth and 
leverage had a significant effect on tax avoidance 
efforts. 
The number of independent commissioners has a 
strong enough influence on compliance in paying 
taxes as regulated by the Financial Services Authority 
Article 21 paragraph 2, it is explained that there is an 
independent commissioner who does not take sides 
with anyone in the company. The increasing number 
of independent commissioners is expected to 
encourage transparency in monitoring management 
behavior. In banking companies, it shows that on 
average 60% is dominated by independent 
commissioners and the average level of avoidance 
efforts is strong. The results also showed that the 
greater the composition of the commissioners had a 
significant effect on tax avoidance efforts. 
Independent commissioners are able to provide an 
independent attitude so that the supervisory function 
runs well. The duties and functions of the independent  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Test Results. 





























Profitability -0.291 0.099*** 







Leverage 0.032 0.005* 
*)     significant in 0.01 
**)   significant in 0.05 
***) significantin 0.10 
commissioner are to supervise and control in 
providing useful information to the alified party. 
Independent commissioners are also responsive in 
paying attention to the presence or absence of tax 
avoidance so as to reduce tax sanctions. 
The company's strategy regarding taxation must 
be supervised and controlled in a structured manner 
by management, commissioners and audit committee 
so that the company is not too aggressive and avoids 
tax sanctions that will harm the company later. The 
presence of independent commissioners as parties 
involved in supervision is expected to be able to act 
independently because independent commissioners 
have no direct interest in the company's operations or 
decision-making parties. This is in line with agency 
theory regarding the importance of the supervisory 
function so that agents are not selfish and able to be 
accountable for their duties in a transparent manner. 
The results of this study are supported by previous 
research carried out by (Sofiati & Zulaikha, 2018; 
Kurnia et al., 2019) which stated that the independent 
board of commissioners tends to encourage company 
management to disclose broader information to 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
This was different from the results of other 
hypothesis testing. Gender, tenure and political 
connections of commissioners did not have a 
significant effect on tax avoidance. The majority of 
boards of commissioners in Indonesian banking were 
male, with a tenure of more than 2 terms and without 
political connections. The risk preferences faced in 
the banking and other financial service industries are 
indeed classified as larger, therefore there was no 
need for individual character requirements to occupy 
the position of commissioner. Besides, tax avoidance 
efforts are considered a routine strategy that 
companies must undertake as a legal effort, without 
having to consider the presence or absence of political 
connections. Banking still prioritizes the provisions 
stipulated in the OJK regulations and the Limited 
Liability Company Law, particularly in relation to the 
number of independent commissioners and the 
commissioners' field of expertise. The results of this 
study are supported by Charness & Gneezy (2012); 
Faccio et al. (2016); Winasis et al., (2017), Farag & 
Mallin (2018), Chyz & Gaertner (2018) 
In addition, tax avoidance efforts are also 
influenced by financial performance such as 
profitability, capital intensity, company growth and 
leverage. Efforts to maximize profits and company 
assets can be achieved if the company is able to make 
efficiency and minimize costs. One of them is by 
reducing the company's tax burden and tax payments. 
Therefore, tax avoidance efforts are appropriate when 
included as part of the company's strategy so that the 
sustainability of the company can be maintained. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Tax avoidance efforts are one of the company's 
strategies specifically related to the taxation aspect. 
Tax avoidance is influenced by the number of 
independent commissioners and the company's 
financial performance. Meanwhile, gender, tenure 
and political connections do not have a significant 
effect on tax avoidance efforts. The existence of 
independent commissioners as parties involved in 
supervision is expected to be able to act 
independently because independent commissioners 
have no direct interest in the company's operations or 
decision-making parties. This is in line with agency 
theory regarding the importance of the supervisory 
function so that agents are not selfish and able to take 
account for their duties transparently. 
This study has limitations: 1) many companies 
have suffered losses before tax and the complete data 
is not available thus the amount of data tested was not 
much compared to other sectors, 2). The financial 
industry has different measurement indicators from 
other industrial sectors thus it requires sufficient time 
in tabulation and testing. With the limitations of the 
research, the suggestions are: 1) it should be able to 
focus on other sectors or increase the research period 
in order to obtain sufficient and generalizable 
samples, 2) it should be able to focus on the two 
pillars of good corporate governance and other 
variables suspected to affect tax avoidance, for 
example the board of directors, audit committee, non-
financial aspects, the role of the independent auditor. 
The implication of this research is the definition 
of tax planning needs to be improved because 
currently it has become the main concern of company 
stakeholders. Likewise for companies and corporate 
stakeholders to consider strategies in the field of 
taxation as part of the company's strategy and utilize 
various tax policies or facilities to support tax 
avoidance efforts. The government is also expected to 
be able to formulate tax policies and facilities that 
accommodate the interests of companies but do not 
harm state revenues. The synergy between the 
company and the government is expected to create 
voluntary compliance among taxpayers. 
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